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Legal cases involving expert testimony, especially by forensic mental health 
professionals, is increasingly relying on remote testimony to reduce associated costs and 
increase availability of such services. There is some evidence to show that expert 
testimony delivered via videoconference (VC) is comparable to expert testimony 
delivered in person; however, the most compelling evidence for this claim is unpublished. 
Other evidence across disciplines showed relative comparability between VC and in-
person modalities across various types of outcomes. Based on both unpublished and 
published findings, this study tested the hypothesis that minimal differences in measures 
of expert credibility, efficacy, and weight assigned to testimony evidence would be found 
when testimony was delivered in person and via VC, with significant differences when 
testimony was delivered by telephone. To test this hypothesis, jury-eligible M-Turk 
workers provided their perceptions about a forensic psychological expert witness after 
viewing a videotaped mock court scenario. The videotaped scenario showed the witness 
testifying either physically in the courtroom, by telephone (audio-only), or using a two-
way video conference system. MANOVA and ordinal regression tests demonstrated 
negligible differences in perceptions of the expert as well as decisions made based on 
their testimony. These findings provide clearer support for the implementation of remote 
testimony in courts. Recommendations for psychological expert witnesses are made 
based on these findings to better serve justice-involved persons and incorporate research-
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CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION 
Until relatively recently, the only way an unavailable witness could provide 
testimony was through written deposition (Federal Rules of Evidence, 2000). As 
technology progressed, courts experimented with telephones as an alternative avenue of 
providing testimony (Croft, 1991). Despite the increased reliability and convenience, 
courts resisted its use by implementing unnecessarily restrictive conditions for the 
admission of telephone testimony during the 1980’s. However, after an elderly home-
bound woman residing in Florida was allowed to testify via telephone in a New York 
case in Ferrante v. Ferrante (1985), courts more readily allowed telephone testimony. 
Similarly, Maryland v. Craig (1990) added one-way video testimony to the list of 
acceptable testimony modalities when the Supreme Court determined that a child’s 
testimony against an abuser, delivered via closed-circuit television, was constitutional 
when the child feared they would be harmed by the defendant if in the same room. Such 
technology allows the witness to be seen and heard by participants in the courtroom as 
they deliver their testimony from a remote location.  
Since the Maryland v. Craig (1990) ruling, video testimony (both one- and two-
way) has been applied in a variety of legal settings, such as terrorism cases, immigration 
hearings, and food stamp appeals court (Lederer, 2004a; Haas, 2006). Although the 
Supreme Court has yet to agree on whether two-way video testimony is constitutional 
(for review, see Aguinaga, 2014), courts continue to apply such technology, particularly 
in cases of expert testimony by mental health professionals (Miller et al., 2008). The 
increased use of remote testimony is often motivated by cost-control. Specifically, 
defendants or the presiding jurisdiction must pay for expert witnesses – a cost which is 
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exacerbated by witnesses who are not local, thereby requiring the witness to travel for the 
case. Unfortunately, many defendants have lower incomes than the general population, 
making costs more burdensome than they would be for others (Nagin & Waldfogel, 
1998). Rural communities are also less likely to have local expert witnesses, resulting in 
both more frequent use of costly non-local experts, and local experts who, while 
knowledgeable in their fields, are not qualified to provide expert testimony. These 
“occasional experts,” as coined by Grisso (1987), may unknowingly provide subpar 
testimony (for the same price as a trained expert). In cases of both local and non-local 
experts, defendants in rural communities are at a disadvantage.    
The rise in application of remote testimony, although effective in reducing costs, 
has prompted questions about the myriad ways that remote testimony may influence other 
aspects of a case, including perceptions by jurors, attorneys, defendants, and subsequent 
decision-making (Lederer, 1994; 2009). Research has explored aspects of remote 
testimony implementation, such as defendant and attorney satisfaction with video 
consultation (McDonald, Morgan, & Metze, 2016) and the influence of video testimony 
on trial verdict (as cited in Lederer, 2009). However, the few known studies on trial 
verdict were not published, so the applicability of the findings are questionable. 
Additionally, further research is needed on remote testimony and how perceptions of the 
expert witness may differ depending on whether he/she is physically or virtually present. 
These are important areas to explore because past research has demonstrated a 
relationship between perceptions of expert witnesses and trial outcomes. Therefore, it is 
unclear if, and how, remote testimony may indirectly influence trial outcomes via 
perceptions of the expert offering key testimony.  
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The current study aims to measure the influence different testimony modalities 
(in-person, video, telephone) may have on potential decision-makers’ perceptions of the 
expert’s credibility, efficacy, social presence, and the weight assigned to expert testimony 
when making legal decisions. Better understanding the inadvertent influences of remote 
testimony may provide guidance to legal professionals when advising their clients and 
witnesses, as certain testimony modalities may result in reduced credibility of expert 
witnesses on the stand—a factor known to influence trial outcomes. This risk concerns 
mental health expert witnesses especially, first because it jeopardizes their adherence to 
relevant ethical principles, such as mental health professionals’ obligation to “do no 
harm” to those they serve (Principle A, American Psychological Association [APA], 
2017) and secondly because they are often involved in high-stakes cases. An unpublished 
pilot study found that difference in perceptions of credibility between trial transcripts 
describing different testimony modalities (expert witness testifying in person or via video 
conference) were negligible (falling below p = .05; Lederer, 2009). These findings are 
promising, as they suggest first that an expert’s credibility remains relatively intact while 
testifying via video conference and second that a more externally valid study may yield 
similar results. The legal history of remote testimony is briefly reviewed next, followed 
by an overview of current literature on outcomes associated with both remote and in-
person mechanisms in legal contexts. 
Constitutionality and Suitability of Remote Testimony 
Telephone Testimony 
It is possible for testimony via telephone to be permitted at the judge’s discretion, 
in lieu of a written deposition, when a witness is unavailable under Rule 804 of the 
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Federal Rules of Evidence (2000). Witness testimony via deposition or telephone are 
considered exceptions to the hearsay rule which would otherwise render such evidence 
untrustworthy. Conditions for exceptions to the hearsay rule include an unavailable 
witness whose testimony does not meet certain criteria (e.g., statements made under 
impression of imminent death; Federal Rules of Evidence, 2000). Testimony via 
telephone was occasionally used in the 1980’s—the ability to deliver testimony in real 
time and direct or cross-examine the witness proving useful in cases exceptional 
circumstances preventing the witness’s in-person testimony. The practice, however met 
opposition via an unreasonably high threshold required for proving a witness’s 
“exceptional circumstances.” Ferrante v. Ferrante (1985) was one of the most visible 
cases in which this high threshold was met, demonstrating for other courts how 
exceptions to the hearsay rule could be met. 
This precedent led to an increase in use of telephone testimony (Croft, 1991); over 
time, district courts upheld the opinion that telephone testimony does not violate a 
defendant’s right to confront witnesses (6th Amend., U.S. Const.), as was the opinion in 
People v. Topping (1988). Topping was found guilty of sexual assault and burglary after 
the victim’s treating physician following the assault testified to the victim’s injuries and 
demeanor. The physician, located in Kentucky, was permitted to testify via telephone for 
the trail in Colorado given the cost associated with travel, a decision Topping objected to. 
The decision to allow telephone testimony was not only affirmed at trial but upheld on 
appeal, the appellate judge’s concluding remarks reflecting a modern interpretation of 
constitutional law:  
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“Face to face is a figure of speech and … the essence of the language really 
means a right to confrontation and cross-examination. … It does not mean the right to 
gaze upon … an individual and note whether … a drop of perspiration pours fourth from 
[his] forehead…” 
~Van Cise, presiding judge 
People v. Topping (1988). 
Such sentiments were echoed in later cases, one such case being Gonsoir v. State 
(1990). Gonsoir, on trial for driving under the influence with an excessive blood alcohol 
content (BAC), objected to the telephone testimony of a witness whose flight was 
cancelled, delaying their arrival to court for several days, citing an inability to observe 
their demeanor as a violation of his constitutional right. The judge, citing People v. 
Topping (1988), allowed the telephone testimony as the scope of the witness’s testimony 
included toxicology test reports, the credibility of which were not under question. 
Video Testimony 
Maryland v. Craig (1990) set a new precedent for future courts. It gave judges a 
reason to allow remote testimony, specifically one-way video testimony, of victims when 
there is reason to believe that testifying in open court would cause distress. Doing so 
would allow the courts to uphold substantial social policy. The judges in this case also 
asserted that, although in-person testimony is always ideal, one-way video testimony 
does not violate the defendant’s right to confront and cross-examine witnesses testifying 
against them, as they have these opportunities when using such technology (Maryland v. 
Craig, 1990). This decision was interpreted by some courts to also apply to telephone 
testimony, as the decision applied to cases in which a witness is both unavailable and 
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requiring an alternative mode of testimony (Croft, 1991). Since then, both video and 
telephone testimony have been used frequently without significant opposition (Croft, 
1991).  
Despite being permissible in the case of Maryland v. Craig , several other cases 
determined conditions under which remote testimony would not be permitted. For 
example, an appellate judge ruled that one-way video testimony by forensic expert 
witnesses in a criminal trial was not constitutional, as video testimony was used without 
an expressed need to do so (Gentry v. Deuth, 2004). Similarly, a court ruled that a child’s 
general fear of the courtroom is not reason enough to allow the child to testify using 
video technology, asserting the need for the child to fear the person they are confronting, 
to justify its use (United States v. Moses, 1998). In sum, judges agree that one-way video 
testimony is effective in protecting young or vulnerable victims from emotional distress 
but should not be applied liberally without good reason (Brooks, 2012).  
A conservative interpretation of the Craig decision leads one to conclude that the 
ruling applies only to one-way testimony where the court can both see and hear the 
witness, but the witness cannot see or hear the court; however, several judges have 
applied the Craig test to two-way testimony, where both the court and witness can see 
and hear each other, in other abuse cases. For example, in United States v. Weekley 
(1997), the judge determined that the child’s legitimate fear of his kidnapper and abuser 
was reason enough to permit his testimony using two-way technology—a decision later 
upheld in similar abuse cases (e.g., United States v. Rouse, 1997). However, other judges 
have concluded differently. For example, in United States v. Gigante (1999), two-way 
testimony by a government-protected witness was used to prosecute prominent gang 
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member Vincent Gigante. On appeal, it was determined that the Craig test did not apply 
to decisions of two-way testimony because the Craig test was intended for one-way 
testimony only.  
Some scholars have made a case for two-way testimony to be permitted under the 
Craig rule (e.g., Mulkey, 2014), stating that two-way testimony should be allowed in 
cases when there is significant public policy to be preserved in doing so, such as a 
defendant’s right to confrontation of witnesses against them. In fact, some judges have 
granted permission to use two-way testimony to adult witnesses who, although not afraid 
to confront the defendant, had legitimate barriers to appearing in court, such as medical 
orders to not travel. In Horn v. Quarterman (2007), a witness to the prosecution was 
undergoing treatment for a terminal illness in a different state from where the trial took 
place. Similarly, a witness in a different case was unable to travel to a court hearing 
because he was elderly and ill (United States v. Benson, 2003). 
Since Maryland v. Craig (1990), testimony using videoconference technology 
(both one-way and two-way, hereon referred to as VC) in court has increased in 
popularity (Miller, 1991). This development posed new questions to judges and scholars: 
what are the circumstances under which VC testimony is constitutional and when is VC 
testimony considered suitable? Indeed, these are the questions on which there is much 
scholarly debate (for a historical review of this debate, see Aguinaga, 2014). Because 
constitutionality and suitability are not mutually exclusive by nature, these questions 
resulted in professionals taking several different sides of the debate: (1) that two-way 
video testimony is neither constitutional nor suitable, (2) is constitutional but not suitable, 
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and (3) that it is both constitutional and suitable. These positions are briefly summarized 
below. 
1) Not only have some cases outright found VC testimony unconstitutional 
(see Gentry v. Deuth, 2004, United States v. Yates, 2004, and United 
States v. Moses, 1998), but legal scholars have argued that the use of VC 
testimony infringes upon the defendant’s right to confront witnesses 
against him or her (Smith, 2013; Garofano, 2007; Gurrieri, 2011), going 
so far as to conclude that the 6th amendment would need to be amended 
before VC testimony could be applied (Smith, 2013). 
2) Some judges and scholars have opined that, while not violating a 
defendant’s right to confrontation, VC testimony is harmful to a trial in 
other ways by introducing distractions or disruptions (Haas, 2006).  
3) Finally, others argue that VC testimony is not only constitutional but 
advantageous to the legal system for several reasons (Tokson, 2007). 
Specifically, VC testimony is constitutional because it still allows the 
witness to be seen, heard, and cross-examined by the defendant and their 
attorney (Aguinaga, 2014; Tokson, 2007). In fact, there are some 
situations in which a defendant’s rights may be violated by prohibiting VC 
testimony. When travel to court is not feasible, for example, it would be in 
the defendant’s best interest for the witness to appear via VC, rather than 
submit a written deposition that does not allow for direct confrontation 
(see United States v. Gigante, 1999). Other scholars have even called for 
the development of a new rule permitting the use of VC testimony so 
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courts can use such technology without risk of penalty (Montell, 2011; 
Gurrieri, 2011). 
Benefits of Remote Testimony. Given the need to reduce trial costs and delays in 
court proceedings, the increased use of remote testimony has been suggested (American 
Bar Association, 1984).  More specific to the present study, Miller (1991) noted that 
forensic psychiatrists, who frequently testify in court, would benefit from the 
implementation of remote testimony because of the time and cost dedicated to travelling 
for trial (see also Miller et al., 2008). Some regions in the U.S. do not have the ease of 
access to healthcare professionals, particularly ones qualified to conduct forensic mental 
health assessments or provide expert testimony (Miller et al., 2008; Grisso, 1987). 
Without such access or resources to pay for evaluations, some jurisdictions may be 
incentivized to simply drop charges or offer quick plea deals that may infringe on a 
defendant’s rights (e.g., if they would otherwise be found incompetent to proceed).  
Criticisms of Remote Testimony. In addition to concerns of constitutionality, other 
concerns have been used to discourage common use of remote testimony including: (1) 
lack of social presence, (2) disruptions that detract from overall efficiency of the trial, (3) 
nature of physiologically processing video information, and (4) ethical risks. Some 
scholars suggest that a lack of social or emotional presence, characterized by feelings of 
connectedness and proximity, in technology-mediated interactions hinders the emotional 
connection and nonverbal communication between the jurors or defendant and witness, 
resulting in differential trial outcomes (Short, Williams, & Christie, 1976). A lack of 
presence has been known to influence perceptions of the witness (e.g., ratings of 
sensitivity, social ability, warmth) and how accurate objects, events, and people appear to 
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be (Lombard & Ditton, 2006). There are concerns that remote testimony results in a lack 
of presence for the expert witness, making them seem more separated from the courtroom 
or the defendant’s reality (Garofano, 2007). One study on asylum hearings, rather than 
criminal trials, found that using VC testimony resulted in a higher likelihood that 
refugees would be denied asylum (Walsh & Walsh, 2007), which was anecdotally 
attributed to the refugee defendant’s lack of emotionality while testifying.  
Others point to inconveniences and disruptions to otherwise efficient court 
proceedings as reason enough to forego remote testimony. One study reported attorneys’ 
dissatisfaction after immigrants used VC testimony to appear in court hearings. Among 
cited problems with VC use was poor internet connections, difficulty translating the 
witness’s testimony by an interpreter, and barriers to nonverbal communication (e.g., eye 
contact, body language; Haas, 2006).   
Some research also suggests that people process visual information from videos 
differently than in-person, as processing video information is more visually complex 
(Granot, Balcetis, Feigenson, & Tyler, 2018). For example, the number of items to 
visually attend to within a short amount of time, variations in picture vividness, and 
discrepancies between the camera perspective and the perspective required to attend to 
particular information, can detract a person from fully or accurately attending to the 
information required of them. Because of these and other differences people tend to 
believe in the accuracy of video information more so than other types of information and 
are less able to discern between accurate and inaccurate interpretations of video evidence 
(Granot et al., 2018). Thus, it is possible that jurors, unbeknownst to them, are not 
scrutinizing VC testimony as closely as they would live witnesses.  
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No research has measured the processing of video compared to in-person 
information from the macro-level perspective described by Granot and colleagues (2018); 
two studies, however, compared video to in-person trial scenarios and their effects on 
trial outcomes.  One study used live, color video, black-and-white video, audio, and 
transcript modalities to compare measures of restitution and perceptions of the expert 
witness (Williams et al., 1975). Results found that money awarded to plaintiffs did not 
differ between live, video, and transcript-only presentations and experts were perceived 
as equally honest and objective across all presentations. However, it was found that 
experts in the live presentation were rated as more competent than experts in the 
transcript-only presentation; no differences between live and video presentations were 
found, suggesting that expert testimony via VC or deposition will differ minimally from 
in-person testimony. However, the dated nature and particular methodology of this study 
is insufficient to draw firm conclusions without additional research.   
Another, more recent, study found that when comparing in-person trial stimuli 
with video or trial transcript stimuli, experts in the transcript condition were seen as more 
understandable, informative, and less confusing compared to the video condition 
(Pezdek, Avila-Mora, & Sperry, 2009). Similarly, jurors felt the expert witness had a 
greater impact on a case in the transcript condition compared to the video condition. 
Given the discrepancy between this study and Williams et al. (1975), differences in 
perceptions and outcomes in trials using video information are not reliable; therefore, 
more evidence is needed to conclude that the mere presence of video information 
significantly impacts trial outcomes. 
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Finally, it was suggested that witnesses may be tempted to present distorted or 
dishonest testimony if allowed to testify remotely. Lederer (2004; 2009) speculated that a 
lack of physical proximity between the expert witness and the defendant may reduce the 
emotional connection and external cues that remind witnesses of the serious nature of 
courtroom testimony and to instill empathy with the defendant. Lederer suggested that 
these nuanced exchanges in a courtroom could contribute to a witness’s ultimate decision 
to be truthful and uphold the oath they took upon taking the stand. This is a bold claim 
with large, widespread implications that has yet to be supported with empirical research 
(Lederer, 2004; 2009). Nevertheless, this concern was considered here for the sake of 
comprehensiveness. 
In totality, consequences of remote testimony use range from relatively minor 
inconvenience (e.g., poor internet connection) to violating defendants’ constitutional 
rights, and perjury. Although some consequences garnered more empirical support than 
others over the years, the possibility alone of some consequences (e.g., witness perjury) 
justifies research on the matter—if only to clarify which consequences are most unlikely 
to occur.  
The Influence of Testimony Modality on Courtroom Participants and their Decisions 
Beyond the concerns highlighted above, there remains uncertainty considering the 
influence of remote testimony on trial participants’ perceptions of the witness, 
specifically experts, and subsequently their decision making (Khalifa, Saleem, & 
Stankard, 2007). Although a handful of studies have explored the impact of video 
testimony on participant satisfaction, trial outcomes, and perceptions of witnesses, more 
evidence is clearly needed before scholars can conclude that remote testimony does not 
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have a negative impact on jury perceptions of witnesses and trial outcomes (Lederer, 
1994; 2004; 2009). Extant research related to these constructs are discussed next. 
Satisfaction 
Studies conducted on trial participants’ satisfaction with remote testimony 
reported positive feedback for such practices (for review, see Khalifa, Saleem, & 
Stankard, 2007). Miller and colleagues (2008), who followed a custody case in which VC 
testimony was used, found that the judge, attorneys, and family involved in the process 
had positive feedback regarding VC technology and appreciated the reduction in cost 
associated with the expert not traveling. McDonald and colleagues (2016) likewise found 
that VC consultations between attorneys and their clients were rated between “okay” and 
“excellent,” with no differences in working alliance, trust, procedural fairness, or 
satisfaction with representation as a result of using VC.  
Trial Outcomes 
Several studies have been conducted on testimony modality and trial outcomes 
with mixed findings. As a key example, two experiments yielded contradictory results. In 
one experiment, mock jurors’ verdicts did not change when a child eyewitness testified in 
person or closed-caption television (Goodman et al., 1998), while another experiment 
found that the defendant was less likely to be found guilty by the jury when children 
testified via closed-caption television because the witness appeared to be less accurate 
(Orcutt et al., 2001). Another series of unpublished studies were said to reveal no 





Perceptions of Expert Witnesses 
Witness Credibility. Witness credibility is a measurable component of expert 
witnesses and includes factors such as knowledge and trustworthiness (Cramer, Brodsky, 
& DeCoster, 2009). Understanding witness credibility is useful in two ways. First, it 
quantifies testimony performance so that feedback can be provided to witnesses. Second, 
it provides a framework for assessing how other trial participants perceive witnesses so 
the field can better understand how to improve a witnesses’ performance. There is 
evidence that perceived expert credibility impacts trial outcomes (Cooper & Neuhaus, 
2000; Cramer et al., 2009; Cramer et al., 2011), demonstrating a need to understand and, 
when possible, control dynamic factors that may exaggerate such effects in court 
proceedings. Some scholars have suggested modifying jury instruction to acknowledge 
such effects, or even adding rules to trial proceedings that would permit experts from the 
defense and prosecution to testify on factors that influence expert credibility (and 
therefore influence jury decision-making) in trials (Friedland, 1989), with the hope of 
increasing jurors’ ability to fact-find in criminal trials (Ingulli, 1986). 
Differences in witness credibility appear to result from differences in both static 
(e.g., juror gender; Brodsky et al., 2009) and dynamic factors (e.g., eye contact; Neal & 
Brodsky, 2008). Static or relatively unchanging factors have impacted perceptions of 
credibility in past research; for example, female jurors rated likeable witnesses as more 
credible than less likeable witnesses (Brodsky et al., 2009; see also Neal, Guadagno, Eno, 
& Brodsky, 2012). Dynamic factors, or those capable of manipulation or change, have 
also impacted perceptions of credibility. In one study, witnesses with low overall 
confidence (conveyed through both nonverbal and verbal cues, including interrupted 
 
15 
speech patterns, frequent pauses, and requests for questions to be repeated) were 
perceived as less credible than witnesses with high confidence (including loud, rapid 
speech and good posture; Cramer et al., 2011). In another study, witness poise (as 
measured by the Observer Witness Efficacy Scale, OWES; Cramer, DeCoster, Neal, & 
Brodsky, 2013) also predicted ratings of witness credibility.  
Although other factors are not theoretically relevant to expert credibility (e.g., 
witness demeanor; Blumenthal, 1993), it is speculated that marginally relevant factors act 
as cues for more theoretically relevant factors (e.g., witness demeanor a cue for 
trustworthiness). This is expected to also be the case in trials using remote testimony and 
may be one mechanism through which trial-based outcomes, such as jury verdict, vary 
across different trials and scenarios. 
Importantly, perceptions of expert credibility can also have an impact on trial 
outcomes, including juror verdict and sentencing decisions. For example, when witness 
credibility was operationalized as a plaintiff experts’ credentials and whether they were 
paid for their testimony, credibility was partially negatively correlated with juror verdict 
such that higher-credentialed experts who were paid more were associated with verdicts 
that were less favorable to the plaintiff; whereas, when the witness was paid less, there 
was no difference in verdicts across credentials (Cooper & Neuhaus, 2000). In a separate 
study, expert credibility was found to moderate the relationship between expert 
confidence and death penalty recommendations (Cramer, et al., 2011; Cramer et al., 
2009). 
 Some evidence suggests that the relationship between expert credibility and trial 
outcomes is better explained through mediation relationships rather than real-world 
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observations. In one study, expert likeability was positively correlated to expert 
credibility for female jurors, but ultimately unrelated to punishment (Brodsky et al., 
2009). Brodsky and colleagues speculated that the relationship between expert credibility 
and sentencing decisions still existed, but perhaps through a facet of credibility other than 
likeability. The presence of remote technology in a witness’s testimony provides a new 
point of evaluation and may act as a cue for witness likeability or expertise, resulting in 
differential perceptions of witnesses who use remote testimony compared to in-person 
testimony. 
Witness Efficacy. Witness efficacy, or the extent to which an expert witness’s 
testimony is effective, is another method of quantifying perceptions of witness testimony. 
Measures of witness efficacy capture the witness’s ability to provide an objectively good-
quality testimony. Efficacy is different from credibility in that efficacy addresses a more 
intuitive feeling or assumption that the witness succeeded in testifying. As an example, 
consider a highly educated forensic scientist who holds a high position in her lab but 
provides testimony that is timid, inconsistent, and lackluster; contrast her testimony to a 
newly hired bachelor’s level forensic science intern who testifies in a manner that allows 
little skepticism or speculation, is confident, and compelling. The education and 
background of the expert are cues of credibility, whereas the presentation of the 
testimony are cues of efficacy.  
Virtually no research on witness efficacy exists, limiting the data that hypotheses 
can be based on. Anecdotally, remote testimony limits the extent to which observers can 
evaluate components of efficacy—namely, an expert’s poise (e.g., confidence, trial 
preparedness) and communication, especially nonverbal cues (e.g., eye contact, 
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posture)—as these traits are either mediated in VC testimony or entirely unavailable in 
telephone testimony. Thus, it is presently unclear in what ways remote testimony will 
affect perceptions of witness efficacy. 
Present Study 
To date, most of the research on remote testimony is theoretical or lacks a control 
group. Little research exists in which testimony modality was manipulated to allow 
causal relationships to be inferred and consequences measured, let alone that of expert 
witnesses specifically. Therefore, the primary purpose of the present study was to 
experimentally examine whether testimony modality leads to differences in perceptions 
of expert witnesses and their testimony. Although exploratory, this study also examined 
secondary factors that may have influenced the observed relationship, or lack thereof. 
Specifically, the influence of participants’ perceptions of the expert’s social presence was 
measured. Such research must be conducted to draw more accurate conclusions about the 
consequences of remote modalities on testimony and better justify its use for this 
purpose. To better understand the implications of remote testimony, the following 
research questions were addressed. 
Research Questions 
Primary  
(1) Does the mode of expert testimony delivery (i.e., in person, telephone, video 
conference) affect perception of the witness’s credibility? 
(2) Does the mode of testimony delivery affect perception of the witness’s efficacy? 
(3) Does the mode of testimony delivery affect perception of the expert witness’s 
social presence in court?  
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(4) Does the weight assigned to expert testimony evidence differ depending on the 
mode of testimony delivery? 
Secondary 
(5) Can the relationship between testimony modality and perceptions of expert 
credibility and efficacy be explained by perception of social presence? 
Research Hypothesis 
Primary  
(1) It was expected that there would be a statistically significant between-group 
differences in participants’ scores on the Witness Credibility Scale (WCS; 
Brodsky, Griffin, & Cramer, 2010) across the three modality conditions.  
a. There would be no differences in WCS scores between in-person and 
video testimony formats. 
b. WCS scores would be lower for the telephone condition than both the in-
person or video conference conditions. 
(2) It was expected that there would be statistically significant between-group 
differences in participants’ scores on the Observed Witness Efficacy Scale 
(OWES; Cramer et al., 2013) across the three modality conditions.  
a. There would be no differences in OWES scores between in-person and 
video testimony formats 
b. OWES scores would be lower for the telephone condition than both the in-
person or video conference conditions 
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(3) It was expected there would be statistically significant between-group differences 
in participants’ scores on the Social Presence Scale (SPS; Perse et al., 1992) 
across the three modality conditions. 
a. There would be no differences in scores on the SPS between in-person and 
video testimony formats. 
b. SPS scores would be lower for the telephone condition than both the in-
person or video conference conditions. 
(4) It was expected that there would be statistically significant between-group 
differences regarding the weight participants will assign to the testimony evidence 
across the three modality conditions. 
a. There would be no difference in scores of assigned weight between in-
person and video testimony formats. 
b. Scores of assigned weight would be lower between the telephone 
testimony condition and both in-person and video testimonies. 
Secondary  
(5) The relationships between testimony modality and scores on the WCS and OWES 
would be mediated by participants’ scores on the SPS. 
a. SPS scores would be positively correlated with scores on the WCS and 
OWES. 
b. SPS scores would fully mediate the relationship between testimony 




CHAPTER II – METHOD 
Sample 
A nationally representative sample of jury-eligible participants was recruited from 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), a crowdsourcing website used for study 
participation. In an effort to obtain a sample representative of the U.S.A. jury pool in 
terms of gender, age, race, and education, participants were asked to confirm they were 
over the age of 18, a U.S. citizen, fluent in English, and did not have any felony 
convictions. Because the MTurk participant pool, on average, consists of primarily 
participants who are women, well-educated, and from the U.S. (Ross, Zaldivar, Irani, & 
Tomlinson, 2010), a gender quota was employed to ensure an evenly distributed sample 
across genders. A power analysis using a power value of .80 and an alpha level of .05 
indicated a minimum total of 252 participants were needed to detect effect sizes of at 
least η2 = 0.25 using the planned statistical analyses. To account for potential missing or 
invalid data that may need to be removed, this minimum was oversampled by 5%, 
resulting in a final target sample of 265. 
The final sample of 275 was obtained with 51.6% male (n = 143) with a mean age 
of 43.71 (SD = 12.04) years, and a mean education of 15.08 (SD = 2.07) years, 
equivalent to an Associate’s degree. The sample was 77.8% White (n = 214), 8.7% Black 
(n = 24), 8.7% Asian/Pacific Islander (n = 24), 1.8% multiracial (n = 5), and 1.1% Native 
American/Alaska Native (n = 3). Approximately 9.5% of the sample identified as 
Hispanic or Latinx (n = 26). Overall, the sample was politically left-leaning, M = 2.63, 
SD = 1.26, on a scale of 1 (Very liberal/left-wing) to 7 (Very conservative/right-wing). 
Approximately 46.9% participants reported living in a suburban area (n = 127), 32.4% 
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living in an urban area (n = 89), and 20.0% living in a rural area (n = 55). About 23.6% 
of participants reported previously serving on a jury (n = 65), and 17.1% endorsed having 
personally experienced symptoms of a mental illness (n = 47). As a group, participants 
were generally familiar with telecommunications, M = 3.81 SD = 1.02, on a scale of 1 
(not familiar at all) to 5 (extremely familiar). Participant characteristics by condition and 
total sample are reported in Table 1. 
Measures and Materials 
Prior to randomization, participants reviewed an informed consent document. 
Following exposure to the trial stimulus, all participants were administered the WCS, 
OWES, SPS, experimenter-derived questions regarding assigned weight of the testimony 
evidence and expert investment in providing testimony, validity checks, and a 
demographic form. All dependent measures are reproduced in Appendix C.  
Informed Consent 
Interested participants viewed an informed consent form before proceeding to the 
eligibility items. The form described the voluntary nature of the survey and participants’ 
rights to withdraw consent and their participation at any time during the survey. It also 
described the nature and purpose of the study, as well as the minimal foreseeable risks 
and benefits to participation (see Appendix A). Participants provided their electronic 
consent by electing to proceed to the next page of the survey. 
Testimony Modality Video Stimulus 
In the present study, testimony modality was manipulated via a videotaped trial. 
The video stimulus lasted about 10 minutes and included three volunteer actors 
representing a judge, an attorney, and an expert witness. The video was filmed from the 
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vantage point of a juror in the jury box, simulating the view that a juror would have while 
observing a trial in person. In the in-person testimony condition, the video showed the 
expert sitting in the witness stand while providing testimony directly to the court. In the 
telephone condition, the video depicted a telephone sitting on top of the witness stand 
from which the expert witness was heard testifying to the court through speaker mode. 
Because the expert was testifying by telephone, she was not physically visible. In the VC 
condition, the trial video showed a screen displaying the expert’s image in front of the 
witness stand; the expert was pictured in a neutral office setting.  
The videotaped trial portrayed a portion of a mock contested competency hearing. 
The trial script (see Appendix B) included the testimony and cross-examination of a 
forensic psychology expert. The videos were filmed in an active courtroom maintained 
by the University of Memphis Law School Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law that had 
all elements of a typical courtroom: a judge’s bench, witness stand, jury box, and 
traditional emblems (e.g., state seal, the American flag).  
Volunteer actors were recruited from The University of Southern Mississippi to 
play the roles of the expert, judge, and attorney. All actors had experience in related areas 
(e.g., law, forensic psychology) to increase the authenticity of the trial video. In exchange 
for volunteering their time, actors received a monetary gift card of $25.00 and 
refreshments for the one day needed to film the three trial portions. The same actor 
played the same role in every video to eliminate potential confounds of gender, race, or 
individual differences. To accommodate changes in research protocols during the 
COVID-19 pandemic, actors made voice recordings of their roles in their own homes 
using a microphone headset and computer with voice recording capabilities, with the 
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exception of the expert witness actor. Because of this, all actors except for the expert 
witness were not visible in the video stimulus and their speech tone, rate, and inflections 
remained the same across conditions. The expert witness, who is viewed in the video 
stimulus, made efforts to keep their speech tone and inflections the same across all three 
recordings. 
Despite efforts to control actor characteristics, each condition had several key 
differences (e.g., lack of expert physical appearance in the phone condition, an alternate 
physical backdrop for the VC condition); however, these differences are inherent in the 
use of different, remote modalities, and therefore are part of the primary empirical 
question. As such, differences created by the modalities themselves cannot be controlled 
and are therefore not considered extraneous.   
Witness Credibility Scale 
The Witness Credibility Scale (WCS; Brodsky et al., 2010) is a 20-item scale that 
measures four factors (each consisting of five items) encompassing the construct of 
credibility: likeability, confidence, trustworthiness, and knowledge. Each item features 
paired adjectives and 10 points on a bipolar scale format. The full version of the measure 
is available in the original article describing its validation (Brodsky et al., 2010). 
Examples of the items include “dressed formally/informally,” “disrespectful/respectful,” 
and “dishonest/honest.” The measure had adequate reliability both for the total score and 
each  factor (α = .95 overall, and all factors α > .86). Both internal consistency and 
intercorrelations between factors were acceptable across several studies, α > .80 (as cited 
by Brodsky et al., 2010). The WCS has acceptable construct validity, as it was developed 
using several theories on source credibility (Brodsky et al., 2010). It is also correlated 
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with a scale derived from Shapiro’s theory of credibility (1988) that measures both 
credibility and a lack thereof. Positive inter-item correlations ranged from r = .12-.79, 
suggesting adequate convergence. Conversely, negatively inter-item correlations ranged 
from r = -.28  to  -.61, suggested  adequate divergent validity. Of the 50 inter-item 
correlations, 92% of the correlations were significant to at least p < .05. The scale 
appeared to be a sufficient method of measuring credibility, as it accounted for 70% of 
the variance in scores among witnesses (Brodsky et al., 2010). Participants completed the 
full WCS scale after viewing the trial video. The measure demonstrated adequate 
reliability in the present study, α = .98. 
Observed Witness Efficacy Scale 
The Observed Witness Efficacy Scale (OWES; Cramer et al., 2013) is an 18-item 
measure utilizing a 5-point Likert-type response style ranging from “not well” to “very 
well.” Examples of the questions include “Remain calm under cross-examination,” “Be 
comfortable on the witness stand,” and “Provide more than ‘yes/no’ answers.” Average 
scores are calculated for this measure. It is presumed to have acceptable construct 
validity, as it is essentially an adaptation of the theory-driven measure Witness Self 
Efficacy Scale (WSES; Cramer et al., 2010). Confirmatory factor analyses of the OWES 
revealed a similar two-factor structure to the WSES (Cramer et al., 2013). The two 
factors of the OWES are positively correlated with similar factors of the WCS; the poise 
factor of the OWES was positively correlated with witness confidence of the WCS and 
communication style of the OWES was positively correlated with trustworthiness, 
likeability, and knowledge of the WCS. Internal consistency for the OWES appears 
adequate, with factor loadings exceeding .87. There is evidence for the predictive validity 
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of the OWES in that factors, namely poise and communication, predict perceived witness 
credibility (as measured by the WCS) and juror verdict (Cramer et al., 2013). Because the 
original scale does not account for the possibility that some aspects of the expert witness 
could be unobservable (e.g., avoid fidgeting; Cramer et al., 2013), an “N/A or Not 
Observed” scale option was added to account for items that could not reasonably be 
assessed due to the testimony modality (e.g., assessing posture in phone testimony 
condition). Items endorsed as N/A were not calculated into the average score. Internal 
consistency in the present study was adequate, α = .88. 
Perceived Social Presence 
Because no measure for perceived social presence has been validated, an 
approach to measuring this construct that has been in prior research (Perse et al., 1992) 
was used in the present study. Four questions based on social presence theory (Short, 
Williams, & Christie, 1976) were used to quantify the quality of telecommunications. 
Each asked the respondent to rate the person of interest on a 5-point Likert-type scale, 
with a positive attribute at one end of the scale and a negative attribute at the other. The 
word pairs used for each item were sociable-unsociable, warm-cold, personal-impersonal, 
and sensitive-insensitive. In the original study, the measure yielded an overall reliability 
coefficient of α = .63, demonstrating acceptable reliability (Short et al., 1976). In the 
present study, internal consistency was improved, α = .86. 
Assigned Weight of Evidence 
Weight assigned to testimony evidence was measured using one researcher-
derived question similar to those used in previous research (Visher, 1987). Specifically, 
this item was: “When making decisions about a case, jurors have to decide how 
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important, or how heavily weighted, some evidence is compared to other evidence in the 
case. Considering all facts of the case, how much weight would you assign the expert’s 
testimony, with 0% being no weight at all, and 100% being all of the weight any evidence 
in the case could receive.”  
Expert Investment 
The expert’s investment in providing testimony was measured using one 
researcher-derived item worded; “how invested do you think this expert was in providing 
her testimony today?” with values ranging from 1 or “highly uninvested” to 7 or “highly 
invested.” 
Measures of Individual Differences 
To measure individual differences that were related to the stimulus, several 
single-item measures were derived. First, to measure participants’ familiarity with 
technology, two items were used, including “how familiar would you say you are with… 
telecommunications (e.g., videoconferencing)?” and “how familiar would you say you 
are with…social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter)?” Values ranged from 1 “not familiar at 
all” to 5 “extremely familiar.” Second, to quantify past experiences related to the 
experimental stimulus, two items were included: “have you ever served on a jury?” and 
“have you ever had experience with symptoms of a mental illness and/or a mental health 
diagnosis?” Both items had binary no/yes response options. Last, a single item was added 
to measure individual differences related to attraction to the expert: “How attractive did 





Standard Demographic Form 
To measure the demographic compilation of the sample and account for 
individual differences in some analyses, a de-identified demographic form was 
administered at the end of the survey, addressing group characteristics (e.g., age, 
education, political orientation). 
Validity and Manipulation Checks 
To ensure successful manipulation and participant attention, one true/false 
manipulation check (i.e., “was technology used by the expert to deliver their testimony?”) 
and two attention checks (e.g., “Please select the number 2”) were embedded within all 
survey conditions.  
Procedure 
Participant Recruitment 
A brief description of the study, eligibility criteria, and opportunities for 
compensation was posted to MTurk’s website. Those interested clicked a link provided 
within the MTurk solicitation and were redirected to the Qualtrics survey where they read 
a full informed consent page. Participants were also informed that they need to have 
audio capabilities on their computer. Participants who elected to continue with the survey 
provided their electronic consent. Prior to beginning the study, consenting participants 
verified their age, citizenship, and felony status to ensure eligibility. Participants who did 
not meet eligibility criteria were directed to the end of the survey and were not 
compensated. Additional measures available through MTurk and Qualtrics, such as 
setting quotas for number of participants from each gender by condition, were taken to 




Participants were randomly assigned to only one of the three trial conditions and 
were instructed to watch the corresponding trial video. A setting was enabled in Qualtrics 
so that participants could not proceed to the survey questions until the approximate time 
of the video elapsed. This precaution increased the likelihood that participants would 
actually view and attend to the video. To reduce frustration, participants were informed 
that they were not able to proceed until the timer elapsed. After the video, participants 
completed the assessment battery in which they answered questions about their attention 
to the video, perceptions of witness credibility and efficacy, perceptions of the witness’s 
presence, how much they weighted the testimony content, and a series of demographic 
questions. All measures were counterbalanced within each condition to reduce order 
effects, with the demographic questionnaire always appearing last.  Participants were 
compensated $2.40 for the estimated 20 minutes it took to watch the testimony video and 
complete the questionnaires. This compensation rate was based on the federal minimum 
wage of $7.25 per hour and is the newly recommended standard for MTurk workers 
participating in research studies (Hara et al., 2017). Participants had to complete the 
majority of the study (at least 90%) to earn full compensation.  
Planned Statistical Analysis 
Preliminary Analyses 
Prior to testing the primary hypotheses, data was first checked for accuracy, 
missingness, and that all relevant statistical assumptions were met. Participants who 
failed the manipulation check and at least one attention check and/or who did not 
complete at least 90% of the study, were excluded from analyses. A missing data analysis 
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was conducted to ensure data was missing at random. Assumptions for normality were 
tested on all outcome variables to ensure distributions match a normal curve and were 
within normal levels of skewness and kurtosis using the standards of West and colleagues 
(1996). Internal consistency analyses were conducted on all outcome variables to ensure 
items within the same scale measured the same construct. Significance testing was 
conducted using an alpha level of p = .01. In cases where a null finding was 
hypothesized, two criteria were used to together demonstrate significance and reduce the 
likelihood of making a Type I error, (1) an alpha level of p > .10 and (2) an effect size of 
d < .20 or partial η2 < .01 (for example, see Batastini & Morgan, 2016). 
Primary Analyses 
To test the hypothesis that testimony modality impacted perceptions of the 
expert’s credibility and efficacy, a contrasted multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) was conducted, with testimony modality as the independent variable and 
total scores on the WCS (Hypothesis 1), OWES (Hypothesis 2), SPS (Hypothesis 3), and 
weight assigned (Hypothesis 4) as dependent variables. For the contrast analysis, the 
telephone condition was coded as -2 and both the in-person and videoconference 
conditions were coded as +1. Post-hoc univariate analyses using Bonferroni correction 
were used to determine univariate differences among specific conditions. Measures of 
effect size are reported along with test statistics and alpha values.  
Secondary Analyses 
To test the secondary hypotheses that the relationship between testimony modality 
and WCS and OWES scores was mediated by SPS scores (Hypothesis 5), a path analysis 
was conducted. Testimony modality was entered as the exogenous variable, WCS and 
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CHAPTER III – RESULTS 
Data Cleaning and Assumptions 
A total of 448 men and women initiated study participation. Four respondents did 
not consent to participation, 74 respondents did not meet criteria for jury eligibility, 111 
participants left the study prematurely, and five participants failed at least two of the 
three attention/manipulation checks. The final sample of 275 was analyzed to ensure that 
dependent measures fell within appropriate ranges. There was no missing data for the 
dependent variables of interest. The interquartile range rule was used to determine 
outliers in the dependent variables; extreme low-lying scores were identified and 
removed in the weight assigned to expert opinion, n = 13, WCS scores, n = 15, and 
OWES scores, n = 7, for an end sample of N = 245. Regarding skewness and kurtosis, all 
variables fell within the acceptable range (see Appendix E: Table 2 for values). All 
dependent variables were appropriately correlated, with Pearson’s correlations ranging 
from r = .23 to .62.  
Preliminary Analyses 
To test the effectiveness of random assignment to testimony conditions, several 
analyses were conducted. First, chi-square analyses were conducted with testimony 
modality as the independent variable and gender, race, jury service, and experience with a 
mental illness as dependent variables. All relationships were nonsignificant, with p-
values ranging from p = .27 to 51. Second, several ANOVAs were conducted with 
testimony modality as the independent variable and participant age, education, political 
orientation, and familiarity with telecommunications as dependent variables. All 
relationships were nonsignificant, with p-values ranging from p = .58 to p = .99, with one 
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exception. The relationship between testimony modality and political orientation was 
significant, F(2, 271) = 3.23, p = .04 partial η2= .02. Bonferonni post-hoc analyses 
indicated lower scores in the VC condition, M = 2.42, compared to the in-person 
condition, M = 2.88, indicating that those in the VC condition were significantly more 
“left-leaning” politically. To ensure this difference between conditions did not influence 
the way participants rated perceptions of the expert witness, regression analyses were 
conducted with political orientation as the independent variable and WCS scores, OWES 
scores, SPS scores, and weight assigned as dependent  variables. All regression analyses 
were nonsignificant, with p-values ranging from p = .25 to .50. As a result, no 
modifications to the data analysis strategy were made. 
Primary Analyses 
To test Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4, a contrasted one-way MANOVA was 
conducted. The omnibus test was nonsignificant, Pillai’s Trace: 0.03, F(8, 540) = 0.90, p 
= .54, partial-η2 = .01, indicating no significant differences between the in-person or VC 
testimony conditions and the phone condition. Therefore, no post-hoc analyses were 
interpreted. Results partially supported our primary hypothesis that the expert and the 
evidence (i.e., the forensic opinion) presented during testimony would be perceived 
similarly when the expert appeared in-court and in video. However, use of the phone to 
deliver testimony did not lead to differential attitudes toward the expert. Of note, the 
majority of group averages on dependent measures across all three conditions fell above 
the respective scale mid-point, suggesting overall positive attitudes toward the expert 
witness and testimony evidence. Mean scores for the overall sample and by condition are 




There was no significant relationship between testimony condition and all 
outcome variables. Because of this Hypothesis 5 was not tested given its contingency on 
the existence of a relationship.   
Exploratory Analyses 
Participant Gender 
A two-way MANOVA with both testimony modality and participant gender as 
independent variables revealed that there were no main effects of either testimony 
modality, F(8, 534) = 0.91, p = .51, partial η2 = .01, or participant gender, F(4, 266) = 
1.31, p = .27, partial η2 = .02. Additionally, there was no interaction between the two 
variables, F(8, 534) = .95, p = .48, partial η2 = .02. In short, the relationship, or lack 
thereof, between testimony modality and relevant outcome variables did not change 
based on participant gender. 
Expert Investment in Testimony 
A one-way ANOVA indicated that testimony modality did not significantly 
impact ratings of the expert’s investment in providing testimony, F(2, 272) = 0.19, p = 
.83, partial η2 = .001. A series of linear regression analyses revealed that ratings of expert 
investment significantly predicted WCS scores, β = .37, r2 = .14, p < .001, OWES scores, 
β = .23, r2 = .05 p < .001, SPS scores, β = .31, r2 = .10, p < .001, and weight assigned to 
expert’s opinion, β = .36, r2 = .13, p < .001. In other words, regardless of testimony 
modality, participants who perceived the expert as more invested in providing testimony 
were more likely to also perceive the expert as more credible, efficacious, and socially 




A one-way ANOVA revealed that ratings of expert attractiveness significantly 
varied by testimony modality, F(2, 272) = 47.06, p < .001, partial η2 = .26, with lower 
ratings of attractiveness in the phone condition, M = 3.19, compared to both the in-
person, M = 4.00, [95% CI: -1.03, -0.58], and VC conditions, M = 3.98, [95% CI: -1.01, -
.56].  Using a one-way MANCOVA, with ratings of expert attractiveness held constant, 
the relationship between testimony modality and the primary outcome variables remained 
nonsignificant, Pillai’s Trace: .04, F(4, 538) = 1.22, p = .29, partial η2 = .02. A series of 
linear regression analyses showed that expert attractiveness significantly predicted WCS 
scores, β = .18, r2 = .03, p = .003, and weight assigned to the expert’s opinion, β = .20, r2 
= .04, p = .001, but not OWES scores, β = .07, r2 = .01, p = .25, or SPS scores, β = .12, r2 
= .01, p = .05. Thus, participants across conditions who rated the expert as more 
attractive were more likely find her more credible and assign more weight to her opinion. 
Agreement with Competency Decision 
A chi-square analysis was conducted to determine if testimony modality impacted 
participants’ agreement with the expert’s opinion that the defendant was competent to 
proceed. There was not a significant difference in decisions of competency based on 
testimony modality, 𝜒2 = .05, p = .98. Across all conditions, the majority of participants 
agreed with the expert (89.69%, 88.89%, and 89.77% selected “competent” for in-person, 
VC, and phone conditions, respectively). Thus, it appears most participants went along 
with the expert’s forensic opinion irrespective of extraneous factors like the use of remote 
testimony. All percentages are reported in Table 1.   
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An additional binary logistic regression was conducted with perceived SPS total 
scores as the predictor and competency decision as the outcome. The relationship was 
significant in that increases in SPS scores resulted in a higher likelihood participants 
would agree with the expert and rate the defendant as competent, -2LL = 178.91, β = .16, 
Wald statistic = 6.21, Cox & Snell R2 = .02, p = .01. Based on these findings, social 
presence seems to have more bearing on participants’ level of agreement than testimony 
modality.  
Familiarity with Telecommunications 
A moderation SEM model was tested, with testimony condition as the exogenous 
variable, familiarity with telecommunications as the moderating variable, and WCS 
scores, OWES scores, and weight assigned to expert opinion as endogenous variables. A 
separate model was tested for each endogenous variable. Results indicated that 
participants’ increased familiarity with telecommunications predicted increases in WCS 
scores, β = .20, p = .005, but not increases in OWES scores, β = .06, p = .42, or weight 
assigned to forensic opinion, β = .07, p = .36. The interaction between familiarity with 
telecommunications and testimony condition did not significantly predict WCS scores, β 
= -.11, p = .14, OWES scores, β = -.03, p = .72, or weight assigned to forensic opinion, β 
= -.06, p = .41. Therefore, participants’ subjective familiarity with telecommunications 
did not moderate the relationship between testimony modality and expert credibility, 




CHAPTER IV – DISCUSSION 
With greater acceptability in courts, remote technologies have provided an 
efficient and low-cost way for experts to deliver testimony. This practice offers solutions 
to common barriers for courts and defendants, including more affordable access to expert 
testimony for underprivileged defendants and rural jurisdictions as well as reducing 
public health risk amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Unfortunately, research to date has 
been unclear about the influences of remote testimony compared to traditional testimony 
on factfinders and legal outcomes. Previous studies used vignettes describing the use of 
remote testimony or written transcripts of legal proceedings that, while useful, may be 
less believable or lack external validity compared to a more ecologically valid stimulus. 
In the context of one of the most common types of psycho-legal referrals, the current 
study manipulated the modality of an expert’s testimony to measure changes in 
perceptions of credibility and efficacy, as well as the amount of weight assigned to the 
expert’s opinion. Social presence of the expert and other relevant variables also were 
examined to determine their influence on these relationships.  
Overall, a priori hypotheses were partially supported. As expected, there were no 
differences in participants’ perceptions of the expert or her opinion between the in-person 
and video conditions. However, perceptions were not less favorable in the phone 
condition. Importantly, participants had the opportunity to rate a trait on the OWES as 
“not observable,” leading to fewer characteristics of efficacy being endorsed in the phone 
condition. To better accommodate situations in which testimony modality may obstruct 
or eliminate some aspects of an expert’s presentation or behaviors, the OWES may need 
to be modified to include technology-specific items (e.g., “the expert appeared engaged 
 
37 
even through a video monitor”) or offer a response option when certain traits cannot be 
fully observed due to the use of technology (e.g., “N/A: the technology prevented me 
from being able to observe this behavior”). Modifications made to the OWES should also 
include recommendations on how to score N/A or unobservable items, as well as 
normative data on how other remote experts are rated compared to in-person experts. 
Secondary analyses further revealed that testimony modality did not ultimately impact 
participants’ ultimate legal decision, such that an overwhelming majority agreed with the 
expert regardless of how she testified.  
Differential perceptions of the expert may still occur in the real world, but not 
detected in this study. It is possible that a social contract may exist between in-person 
court participants and expert witnesses that all responsible parties attend proceedings in 
person. Consider jurors who must make extensive arrangements to fulfill obligations of 
jury duty, such as taking unpaid leave from work, finding childcare, and paying for 
transportation—the sense of an implicit agreement that others would also go to similar 
lengths to attend in person. Experts who seem to violate this social contract may be 
perceived less favorably and differences in legal outcomes may arise. Participants in the 
present study may not have felt a social contract was present, as they completed the 
survey online and the expert witness was depicted in a pre-recorded hearing—this 
arrangement did not require either participant or expert to be physically present in the 
courtroom. This may have encouraged more empathic, favorable perceptions of the 
expert.  
Results also did not support the role of social presence theory in explaining 
relationships among testimony modality and participants’ perceptions across outcomes of 
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interest. While social presence was not a compelling determinant of perceptions as a 
byproduct of remote technology systems, analyses showed that more social presence 
predicted higher perceptions of expert credibility, efficacy, more weight assigned to the 
expert’s opinion, and greater agreement with the expert’s opinion regarding defendant 
competency. The influence of social presence on weight participants assigned to the 
expert’s opinion and their agreement with the forensic opinion is of particular interest as 
these outcomes are more directly related to the ultimate legal decision. Jurists who assign 
less weight to the expert’s opinion simply on the basis of lower social presence may be 
discounting accurate information that is integral to the psycho-legal question at hand, 
leading to unjust outcomes for defendants. Taken together, social presence may be an 
especially important factor for ensuring an expert’s opinion is valued in court—one that 
is not necessarily depreciated by the use of technology.  
Results further suggest that perceptions of expert investment and attractiveness, 
while minimally related to testimony modality, were associated with other testimony-
specific traits of the expert and how much weight participants would give to the expert’s 
opinion. Regarding investment, it would not be unreasonable for people to assume that an 
expert who appears invested in providing quality testimony is, in fact, providing quality 
testimony (both in terms of what is being said and how it is being delivered). From this, it 
seems that the opinions of invested experts are subsequently weighted more heavily than 
those less invested. However, it is unclear which specific expert characteristics embody 
increased investment in testimony and to what extent this may simply be another facet of 
witness efficacy. As would be expected, mean expert attractiveness ratings were lower 
when the expert testified via phone, likely because it is rather difficult to judge 
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someone’s physical attraction by the sound of their voice. However, attractiveness did not 
significantly interact with testimony modality to influence credibility, efficacy, or weight 
assigned to the opinion. Yet, the finding that attractiveness independently predicted 
credibility and evidence weight is consistent with research as early as the 1980’s (Patzer, 
1983) linking attraction to source credibility. While not a primary aim, this study 
advances the need to develop techniques for mitigating the extraneous influence of 
attractiveness on legal proceedings.  
Based on prior evidence that familiarity with a phenomenon often reduces 
concerns or biases, including studies on the use of videoconferencing and other digital 
technologies in forensic mental health assessments (Batastini et al., 2019; Batastini et al., 
2021), it was relevant to explore whether participants’ self-reported familiarity with 
telecommunication systems may have contributed to observed relationships, particularly 
within the VC and phone conditions. Contrary to extant research, familiarity did not 
moderate the relationship between any of the primary outcomes and testimony modality. 
Unexpectedly, participants who were more familiar with telecommunications rated the 
expert as more credible across all condition (even in-person), but ratings of efficacy and 
evidence weight were unaffected. Thus, prior use or exposure to technology-based 
communication methods by triers of fact may not be a particularly important 
consideration when testifying remotely. In total, additional research is needed to explore 
how extra-legal expert and courtroom variables, as well as participant characteristics, are 
relevant to remote testimony, and what impact they may have on legal decisions and 
perceptions of the expert not considered here.  
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Recommendations for Forensic Practitioners and Legal Personnel 
 The results of the present study offer some assurance in maintaining 
current practices as they relate to the admissibility and use of remote testimony, including 
phone and two-way video, as well as offering additional considerations that may be 
needed in future cases involving experts who are not physically in the courtroom. First, 
while the decision to use remote testimony remains with the presiding judge, results of 
this study indicate that psychological experts can use remote testimony and expect their 
credibility and effectiveness on the stand to remain largely intact, with minimal risk that 
the method of testimony will influence ultimate legal decisions. Thus, given the dual 
benefits of potential cost-savings (to the defendant or the court) and greater accessibility 
of experts, it is recommended that remote testimony be a first-choice consideration. In 
fact, choosing to use remote technologies may be more closely aligned with the APA 
General Principle of Justice (APA, 2017), particularly for rural or poorer defendants, in 
some cases. That is, remote testimony may help level the playing field. However, as more 
research is still needed, remote testimony may not be desirable in higher-stakes legal 
cases (e.g., high-profile or highly publicized trials, competency for execution hearings). 
Additionally, Luxton and colleagues (2014) outlined several circumstances in which 
using remote technology may be contraindicated in the context of forensic evaluations—
these same guidelines may be applicable to remote testimony as well. For example, when 
one party (e.g., the presiding judge, an attorney) is less accepting of remote technologies, 
testifying remotely may be met with more skepticism; or, communities that are generally 
older or of a lower socioeconomic status may have more difficulty reading social cues 
and interpreting nonverbal communication of an expert testifying remotely.  
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Second, even though familiarity with technology did not have a significant impact 
in the present study, it remains possible that familiarity impacts other legal perceptions or 
outcomes not considered here, such as attitudes toward defendants who present for trial 
remotely or scientific evidence involving technology, such as risk predictions via 
machine-learning. As a precaution, it may be wise for attorneys and trial consultants to 
assess potential jurors for familiarity with technology during the voi dire process. It 
would be wise to consider asking the jury pool forthright questions about familiarity with 
technology and their ability to be fair in cases with remote testimony (e.g., “How familiar 
are you with remote communication methods, such as videoconferencing software or 
conference calls?”, “Do you think your comfort level with these technologies could 
change the way you view professionals who use them?” and “An expert in this case will 
be testifying with videoconferencing software, like Zoom. Do you believe you can view 
their testimony objectively and make fair decisions in the case even though they are not 
physically in the room?”). Attorneys whose retained expert is testifying remotely may 
consider removing participants less familiar with telecommunications (e.g., conference 
calls, Zoom videoconferencing software) from the juror pool to avoid differential trial 
decisions based on any preconceived attitudes. Additionally, as a means of safeguarding 
against any potential negative attitudes toward experts testifying remotely, retaining 
attorneys may build in questions about the acceptability and influences of remote 
testimony, as well as the expert’s investment in providing high-quality testimony, into the 
direct examination of forensic psychological experts. For example: “Is it typical for 
psychological experts such as yourself to testify remotely?” and “does the fact that you 
are testifying remotely change your testimony today or your opinion regarding the 
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defendant?” Experts may also educate the retaining party about research on remote 
testimony and encourage them to include such questions to ensure the expert has a chance 
to settle any doubts concerning their professionalism or preparedness, in turn, reducing 
the likelihood that remote testimony will result in differential trial outcomes.  
Finally, present findings suggested that experts are perceived as more credible and 
efficacious, with more weight assigned to their opinions, when they are perceived as 
more attractive and more sociable, warm, and sensitive on the witness stand. While the 
influence of attractiveness has been shown for men and women professionals (Hahn & 
Cummins, 2017), the attributes of social presence are traditionally characterized as 
feminine traits and may be preferred in a woman expert. It is unknown whether the social 
presence as measured in this study would be similarly associated with favorable 
perceptions of a male expert. Research on male professionals with characteristics counter 
to a male stereotype (e.g., a man with effeminate hand gestures or manner of dress) is 
generally lacking. Until additional research provides clarity on this matter, experts should 
aim to present as relatable (e.g., avoiding jargon and making humble statements when 
appropriate, as suggested by Brodsky et al., 2009), but remain cognizant about their level 
of warmth and sociability.  
Study Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
On the surface, arguably the most significant limitation was the use of a video 
format to create all stimulus conditions. In other words, it could be argued that the in-
person condition was not truly an in-person condition. This argument certainly has some 
merit. This methodology was selected for several reasons: (1) given the ongoing COVID-
19 pandemic, it was a violation of health recommendations to recruit participants for in-
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person data collection, (2) beyond pandemic-related restrictions, it would be impractical 
to re-create a live-action mock trial enough times to obtain the number of participants 
needed for this study without introducing extraneous variables (e.g., changes in actor 
presentation style, differences in participant visibility/proximity to the expert), and (3) 
video stimuli are commonly used when in-person trials are not feasible (see Neal & 
Brodsky, 2008 for an example). Given the relative novelty of this study, we believe the 
use of tighter experimental controls via videotaped mock hearings was a strength. 
Further, in the in-person condition, the expert was clearly positioned in the courtroom 
witness box and the camera was intentionally positioned at a distance similar to where 
other courtroom participants may be located; thus, there is little reason to expect 
participants would have been keen to any additionally relevant behavioral data had they 
been sitting in the courtroom in place of the camera lens. 
Nonetheless, there are other limitations worth highlighting.  
First, this study examines perceptions of participants in the context of a contested 
competency hearing, which are typically heard and decided by a judge. Because judge 
samples are difficult to access, layperson samples are the preferred sample of 
convenience (Bornstein & Breene, 2011). One literature review demonstrated that the 
majority of research examining psychological expert witnesses and legal decision-making 
used samples of “mock jurors” and even asked questions related to psycholegal decisions 
(i.e., decisions of competency) as well as verdict (van Es et al., 2020). Research 
comparing layperson and judge samples have found that in many cases, they have similar 
perceptions and make decisions in similar ways. For example, Weinberg and colleagues 
(2019) found that both laypeople and judges considered the costs associated with granting 
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a workplace accommodation request.  Even still, additional research is needed to 
determine if judges would rate experts similarly to a nationally representative group of 
participants who do not have experience deciding legal issues. Judicial exposure to expert 
testimony may also minimize any negative perceptions. As gatekeepers of evidence 
submitted to court, studies looking at attorney perceptions would also be useful. 
Second, the gender presentation of the expert in the present study was that of a 
woman. While no other actors were visible in the video, their voices likely offered cues 
as to their own gender presentation. Given that expert gender has influenced perceptions 
of the expert and legal decisions in the past (Neal & Brodsky, 2008), gender biases may 
have been present in the present study. Additional studies that manipulate gender 
presentations and/or gender-congruent behaviors (e.g., an expert man who presents as 
exceptionally sociable and warm; an expert woman as unsociable and cold) and measure 
individual traits, like sexist attitudes or socially conservative ideas, could provide further 
evidence about the presence of a gender effect.  
Third, the present study does not inform cases in which the expert is a person of 
color and how they may be perceived. For example, Black experts who testify remotely 
may have the added disadvantage of being subjected to racial stereotypes, specifically 
that Black men and women are “lazy” and “lack discipline” (Peffley et al., 1997). While 
the White expert in the present study was perceived similarly when testifying both in-
person and remotely, Black experts may be perceived less favorably when testifying 
remotely compared to in-person as it may confirm participants’ stereotyped expectations. 
This necessitates further research both manipulating race and measuring for related 
outcomes, such as racist attitudes and perceived social distance.  
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Fourth,, this study included the opinion of only one expert. In psycho-legal cases, 
particularly those that come before the court, there are likely to be expert witnesses for 
both the defense and prosecution. In fact, it has been recommended that more than one 
forensic psychological expert be employed in legal proceedings (Larrick, 2004). Thus, 
the present study may lack some generalizability to real-world court proceedings in 
which there is an expert with an opposing opinion. Future research should consider 
varying the direction of the expert’s opinion (e.g., competent vs. incompetent) and the 
modality of testimony by opposing experts (e.g., having one side testify remotely and the 
other side testify in-court). Lastly, participants were not told why the expert testified 
remotely. It is possible that, without a reasonable explanation, some participants may 
make assumptions; for example, that the expert testified remotely due to lack of 
investment in the case. This may be a more salient concern if one expert was able to 
present to court for testimony and the other was not. 
Future research should not only aim to address the limitations of the present 
study, but it should also explore the impact of remote testimony on perceptions of 
different types of experts (e.g., forensic science experts) and in the context of other types 
of psycho-legal court proceedings (e.g., criminal responsibility, child custody hearings, 
personal injury cases, immigration hearings). Further, research should explore other 
perceptions or attitudes not considered in the present study, as well as participant- (e.g., 
experience with videoconferencing software specifically in the workplace, cultural 
background), defendant- (e.g., race/ethnicity, offense type), or expert-related (e.g., 
gender, posture) variables that may influence perceptions of forensic professionals who 
rely on remote testimony. For example, it is possible that an online sample held overall 
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positive attitudes toward the use of technology for accomplishing traditionally in-person 
tasks, such as work and court proceedings, and that these attitudes were more positive 
than the typical juror or judge. Future research would need to explore attitudes toward 
technology more directly. 
Conclusions 
This study is the first to empirically test whether remote testimony negatively 
impacts perceptions of forensic psychological expert witnesses compared to in-court 
testimony. Taken together, findings provide support for the continued use of remote 
telecommunications by expert witnesses, particularly at a time when the benefits of 
testifying remotely transcend costs-savings and increased access for underprivileged 
populations. The admissibility of virtual testimony also serves the greater public by 
reducing pre-existing wait times associated with forensic evaluations and court 
proceedings (e.g., competency evaluations; Thomas et al., 2009) as well as pandemic-
related concerns for both local and more distant experts. However, we urge additional 
research on other factors (e.g., reasons for using remote testimony, audio-video quality, 
camera angle or backdrops, defendant characteristics) that may mediate technology-
associated perceptions and whether perceptions of remote testimony or the experts who 
use it actually translate to decisions that differentially impact defendant trajectories 




APPENDIX A – INFORMED CONSENT 
The following information pertains to your participation in this study: 
As indicated on the MTurk recruitment page, this study is for people who are 
United States citizens, speak fluent English, and do not have any felony charges. If 
you do not meet ALL of these qualifications, you will be disqualified from 
participation.  
Purpose:   
Thank you for your interest in this study! Our hope is to learn more about how potential 
jurors perceive expert testimony. 
Description of Study:  
You will be asked to watch courtroom testimony by an expert witness and answer several 
questions about your perceptions of the expert witness. You will also be asked basic 
demographic questions, such as your age and gender. None of these questions will ask 
you for personally identifying information. Your participation is expected to take 
approximately 10 minutes or less.  
Benefits:  
Upon completion of the study, you will receive monetary compensation as set by 
Amazon Mechanical Turk for a study of this length. 
Risks: 
There are no anticipated adverse effects of your participation beyond those associated 




No identifying information will be asked of you or connected to you responses on this 
survey.   
Participant's Assurance:  
This project has been reviewed by the Institutional Review Board, which ensures that 
research projects involving human subjects follow federal regulations.  
 
Any questions or concerns about rights as a research participant should be directed to the 
Chair of the IRB at 601-266-5997. Participation in this project is completely voluntary, 
and participants may withdraw from this study at any time without penalty, prejudice, or 
loss of benefits.   
 
Any questions about the research should be directed to the Principal Investigator, Ashley 
Jones, M.S., at ac.jones@usm.edu. 
 
By clicking "Take me to my survey!" you are consenting to participate in this study and 
asserting that you are 18 years of age or older, a current U.S. citizen, and have not been 
convicted of a felony. To exit now, please select "I changed my mind." Even if you 
decide to continue, you may exit at any time during the survey. However, if you elect to 








1. Which gender best describes you? While we understand these options may not 
fully capture the gender you identify with. You will have an opportunity to better 
describe your gender later. 
a. Man 
b. Woman 
2. Are you over the age of 18? 
a. No 
b. Yes 
3. Are you a United States citizen? 
a. No 
b. Yes 
4. Are you fluent in English? 
a. No 
b. Yes 






APPENDIX B TRIAL SCRIPT 
The following document is formatted as a script; bracketed information is not 
spoken lines but stage directions.  
Defense Attorney: Your Honor, I have reviewed Dr. Rice's evaluation. I have spoken 
with my client before today's hearing and, at this point, I do have to disagree with the 
conclusion. I think the Court will see that Mr. Wood is not able to proceed. 
 Judge: For the record, the Court will find that Dr. Lillian Rice is a licensed Psychologist 
and I will allow her to give opinions within that profession. Dr. Rice, if you'll please 
come forward. [The Judge raises his right hand to demonstrate what he wishes Dr. Rice 
to do to take the oath.] Please raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear and affirm 
under penalty of perjury that the testimony you're about to give is the truth, the whole 
truth and nothing but the truth? 
 Psychologist: I do. 
 Prosecutor: Dr. Rice, you have before you what's been marked as State's Exhibit 1, a 
forensic competency evaluation dated October 20, 2019. Is that the forensic evaluation 
that you completed? 
 Psychologist: Yes, it is. 
 Prosecutor: Before you prepared the evaluation, did you review any collateral sources? 
 Psychologist: Yes, I reviewed all the police reports and investigative reports related to 
this incident. 
 Prosecutor: Were there any other collateral sources of information? 
 Psychologist: Yes, I also talked to Mr. Wood' father, Mr. Roger Wood, over the phone. 
 Prosecutor: You did come up with a mental health diagnosis for Mr. Wood, didn't you? 
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 Psychologist: Yes, I did. 
 Prosecutor: Now is that Psychotic Disorder Not Otherwise Specified? 
 Psychologist: Yes, sir.  
 Prosecutor: Is it possible for a person suffering from Psychotic Disorder Not Otherwise 
Specified nevertheless to be capable of assisting rationally in their defense and also able 
to understand the proceedings? 
 Psychologist: Yes, sir. 
 Prosecutor: As a matter of fact, it's your opinion expressed in this evaluation that Mr. 
Wood, himself, is capable of assisting counsel and capable of understanding the 
proceedings? 
 Psychologist: That's correct.  
Prosecutor: Did you say anything to Mr. Wood at the beginning of the 70-minute 
interview? 
Psychologist: Yes, I told him that this interview was being done in response to a Court 
order; that the report would be sent to the Judge, with copies to the District Attorney’s 
Office, as well as the Defense Attorney; and that nothing he said in the interview is 
confidential and anything could be brought out in Court. 
Prosecutor: Did it appear to you that he understood what you were telling him? 
Psychologist: Yes, I asked him specific questions about it and he was able to respond. 
Prosecutor: Was he able to restate the information that you gave him? 
Psychologist: Yes, sir. 
Prosecutor: Did he indicate whether he was willing to continue with the interview? 
Psychologist: Yes, he said he was. 
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Prosecutor: Is there any significance to the fact that he was able to restate the 
information and then give you a response about whether he wanted to proceed? 
Psychologist: It showed me that he was able to attend to what I was saying; he was able 
to take in that information, and then repeat it in a very logical fashion. 
Prosecutor: Did Mr. Wood tell you anything about whether he had used marijuana? 
Psychologist: Yes, he did – he said he used it sporadically. 
Prosecutor: Did he state anything about consuming alcohol when you talked to him? 
Psychologist: He had some use; it wasn't extensive. 
Prosecutor: Is there anything about his ability to recall past information that entered into 
forming your opinion? 
Psychologist: No, I thought he was a fairly good historian. Much of what he told me 
matched up with what his father told me about his history. 
Prosecutor: Did that have any effect on your opinion about his ability to work with 
counsel? 
Psychologist: No, I thought he should have a good ability to work with counsel – he was 
able to respond to my questions pretty easily, provide information. 
Prosecutor: Did he tell you anything about whether he would be willing to take 
medication for his issues? 
Psychologist: We didn't get extensively into that – he did not seem to be interested in 
medication. He very much believes in natural remedies and did not want to take any 
artificial medications. 




Prosecutor: Did his ability to assess whether or not to take medication have any impact 
on your opinion about his ability to work with counsel? 
Psychologist: No. 
Prosecutor: What is it that led to your opinion that Mr. Wood has the capacity to 
understand the nature of the criminal charges against him? 
Psychologist: I was able to ask Mr. Wood about what the charges were. He was able to 
state them correctly. He was able to tell me what he thought the police alleged that he 
did. He was able to tell me what the consequences of those charges could potentially be. 
He was able to tell me different defense strategies that he might pursue with his attorney. 
He was able to talk to me very logically, seemed to be able to weigh the pros and cons of 
different strategies. 
Prosecutor: And did you include your opinion about his ability to assist counsel? 
Psychologist: Yes, sir. Just as Mr. Wood was able to talk to me, I assumed he could also 
talk to his attorney. The fact that we didn't have any difficulties communicating I thought 
the same could occur with his attorney. 
Prosecutor: Thank you. I have nothing further.  
Defense Attorney: I'm going to ask you a few questions. So, Dr. Rice, how long ago did 
you speak with my client? 
Psychologist: Ten days ago. 





Defense Attorney: Is it true that the jail psychiatric services had not yet spoken with Mr. 
Wood? 
Psychologist: That's correct. 
Defense Attorney: And, in terms of information from the community, I think you 
mentioned that you had very little information? 
Psychologist: I talked with his father, and then I had a little bit of information from the 
Community Health Center. 
Defense Attorney: So based on the information that you had, based on your interview 
with him, you did not see signs that this gentleman would not be able to proceed with 
trial? 
Psychologist: Correct. I did see some signs of hyper-religious thoughts, but they did not 
seem to interfere with his ability to work with you or to understand the Court processes. 
Defense Attorney: And, Doctor, if knowing what you do about hyper-religious thoughts 
– 
Psychologist: Mm hmm. 
Defense Attorney: – and the possibility of emerging mental illnesses in young people, is 
it possible that he might present differently today than he did that day? 
Psychologist: It is always possible. 
Defense Attorney: And did you hear Mr. Wood’s earlier response to the judge’s inquiry 
of his ability to focus? If I may quote Mr. Wood: “I can't place anybody above my Lord. 
He talks to me – even now. And I am listening – always. He’s above all.” 
Psychologist: I did hear what was said. 
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Defense Attorney: Your Honor, my client has authorized me today to tell the Court my 
opinion about whether he is able to proceed and to elucidate for the Court my feeling that 
he is not. He is doing the best he can today—but I think we all see that his presentation is 
different from what the witness observed. I have no further questions, Your Honor. 
Prosecutor: Dr. Rice, were you able to determine whether – given what you saw here – 
your opinion, as expressed in your evaluation of Mr. Wood, has changed? 
Psychologist: Slightly. I still think that Mr. Wood understands the role of the participants 
and the Court. I do think he understands the adversarial nature of the proceeding. I do 
think he's able to communicate with his attorney. What I saw differently is that – a little 
bit more religious thought – I think possibly some of the stressors of the courtroom and 
sitting this long brings out that religiosity a little bit more. It also seems that the internal 
stimuli he sometimes experiences—the hallucinations he sometimes hears—may be more 
prominent also, probably because of stress too. 
Prosecutor: Has your opinion about his ability to proceed changed? 
Psychologist: Ultimately that's the decision of the Court. I'm just telling you what skills I 
think he has or does not have. 
Prosecutor: Has your opinion about his ability to work with his attorney changed as a 
result of what you've seen? 
Psychologist: I think he, I still think he can work with his attorney; however, I think long 
periods of time would not be the optimal way for him to work with his attorney. I think 
his attorney would have to work with him in building the defense in short sessions 
because longer sessions become stressful for Mr. Wood. 
Prosecutor: Thank you. Nothing further, Your Honor. 
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Judge: Dr. Rice–thank you for your testimony here today. You are excused. 





APPENDIX C MEASURES 
Witness Credibility Scale (WCS; Brodsky, Griffin & Cramer, 2010) 
Please rate the witness on the following qualities to the best of your ability. 
1. Unfriendly (1) to friendly (10) 
2. Disrespectful (1) to respectful (10) 
3. Unkind (1) to kind (10) 
4. Ill-mannered (1) to well-mannered (10) 
5. Unpleasant (1) to pleasant (10) 
6. Untrustworthy (1) to trustworthy (10) 
7. Untruthful (1) to truthful (10) 
8. Dishonest (1) to honest (10) 
9. Unreliable (1) to reliable (10) 
10. Not confident (1) to confident (10) 
11. Not self-assured (1) to self-assured (10) 
12. Uninformed (1) to informed (10) 
13. Illogical (1) to logical (10) 
14. Uneducated (1) to educated (10) 
15. Unwise (1) to wise (10) 
16. Unscientific (1) to scientific (10) 
 
Observer Witness Efficacy Scale (OWES; Cramer et al., 2013) 
Please rate the degree to which you feel the witness did the following thins when called to 
testify on the witness stand on a scale from 1 = Not well to 5 = Very well. 
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1. Remain calm under cross-examination 
2. Control her emotions when questioned by an aggressive attorney 
3. Maintain a stable tone of voice when speaking 
4. Avoid fidgeting* 
5. Maintain a good posture throughout the testimony* 
6. Be comfortable on the witness stand 
7. Remain poised when being questioned by an attorney 
8. Maintain eye contact with the jury* 
9. Hold eye contact with an attorney* 
10. Hide nervousness 
11. Convey confidence in her ability 
12. Organize her thoughts 
13. Comfortably admit when she was uncertain of an answer 
14. Sit up* 
15. Lean slightly forward when answering some questions* 
16. Provide more than “yes/no” answers 
17. Act natural 
18. Be themselves when testifying. 
* Indicates items will have a “not observed” option in the telephone modality condition, 
as the expert will be not be visible in this condition. 
 
Social Presence Scale (SPS; Perse et al., 1992) 
Please rate the witness on the following qualities to the best of your ability. 
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1. Sociable (1) to unsociable (5) 
2. Warm (1) to cold (5) 
3. Personal (1) to impersonal (5) 




If you were a juror in this case, how much weight do you think you would place on Dr. 
Rice’s testimony when deriving your verdict, from 0 = no weight (“I would not consider 
this testimony in making an opinion) to a 10 = a lot of weight (“this data would heavily 
influence my opinion”)?  
 
Validity Checks 
1. Was technology used by the expert witness to deliver their testimony? 
a. No 
b. Yes 








1. What is your age? 
2. What is your identified gender? 
 a. Man 
b. Woman 
 c. Transgender 
d. Gender non-conforming 
e. Other: _______ 
f. No answer 
3. What is your ethnicity? 
 a. African-American 
 b. Asian/Pacific Islander 
 c. Caucasian  
d. Native American 
e. Multiracial 
f. Other 
4. Are you Latino/Hispanic? 
 a. No 
 b. Yes 
5. What is your highest level of education obtained? 
 a. Some high school 
 b. High school diploma/GED 
 c. Some college 
 d. Associate’s degree 
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 e. Bachelor’s degree 
 f. Technical degree/certification 
 g. Master’s degree 
 h. Doctoral degree 
6. Have you ever served on a jury? 
 a. No 
 b. Yes 
7. Generally speaking, how would you describe your political orientation? 
 1. Very conservative/right-wing 
 2. Somewhat conservative/right-leaning 
 3. Neutral 
 4. Somewhat liberal/left-leaning 
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Political orientation (1=Very 
liberal, 7=Very conservative) 
2.88 (1.36) 2.42 (1.19) 2.58 (1.19) 2.63 (1.26) 
Familiarity with 
telecommunications (1=Not at 
all familiar, 7=Very familiar) 
3.72 (1.08) 3.87 (1.01) 3.85 (0.98) 3.81 (1.02) 
Familiarity with social 
networking sites (1=Not at all 
familiar, 7=Very familiar) 
4.35 (0.88) 4.51 (0.68) 4.44 (0.70) 4.43 (0.76) 







Gender     
Female 45 (46.4) 46 (51.1) 37 (42.0) 128 (46.5) 
Male 52 (53.6) 43 (47.8) 47 (53.4) 142 (51.6) 
Gender non-conforming -- -- 1 (1.1) 1 (0.4) 
Prefer not to answer -- -- 1 (1.1) 1 (0.4) 
Missing -- 1 (1.1) 2 (2.3) 3 (1.1) 
Race/Ethnicity     
White/Caucasian 72 (74.2) 75 (83.3) 67 (76.1) 214 (77.8) 
Black/African American 10 (10.3) 5 (5.6) 9 (10.2) 24 (8.7) 
Asian American 12 (12.4) 7 (7.8) 5 (5.7) 24 (8.7) 
Native American/Alaska 
Native 
2 (2.1) 1 (1.1) 2 (2.3) 5 (1.8) 
Multiracial 1 (1.1) 1 (1.1) 1 (1.1) 3 (1.1) 
Other -- -- 2 (2.3) 2 (0.7) 
Missing -- 1 (1.1) 2 (2.3) 3 (1.1) 
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Hispanic/Latinx     
Table A2. (continued)     
No 90 (92.8) 80 (88.9) 76 (86.4) 246 (89.5) 
Yes 7 (7.2) 9 (10.0) 10 (11.4) 26 (9.5) 
Missing -- 1 (1.l) 2 (2.3) 3 (1.1) 
Type of Residency     
Urban 39 (40.2) 27 (30.0) 23 (26.1) 89 (32.4) 
Suburban 35 (36.1) 43 (47.8) 49 (55.7) 127 (46.2) 
Rural 22 (22.7) 19 (21.1) 14 (15.9) 55 (20.0) 
Missing 1 (1.0) 1 (1.1) 2 (2.3) 4 (1.5) 
Served on a Jury     
No 72 (74.2) 71 (78.9) 63 (71.6) 206 (74.9) 
Yes 25 (25.8) 17 (18.9) 23 (26.1) 65 (23.6) 
Missing -- 2 (2.2) 2 (2.3) 4 (1.5) 
Experience with Mental Illness     
No 85 (87.6) 71 (78.9) 68 (77.3) 224 (81.5) 
Yes 12 (12.4) 18 (20.0) 23 (26.1) 47 (17.1) 
Missing -- 1 (1.1) 2 (2.3) 3 (1.4) 
Decisions of Competency     
   No 10 (10.31) 10 (11.11) 9 (10.23) 29 (10.55) 





   
Table A3. Skewness & Kurtosis Values for Dependent Variables 
Variable Skewness (SE) Kurtosis (SE) 
WCS Scores -2.59 (.15) 8.48 (.29) 
OWES Scores -1.27 (.15) 1.71 (.29) 
SPS Scores -0.23 (.15) -0.78 (.29) 





Table A4. Average Score Means (Standard Deviations) for Perceptions of Expert 
Witness by Condition and Overall Sample (N = 275) 
Condition WCS Score OWES Score SPS Score 
Weight 
Assigned 
In-Person (n = 97) 8.83 (1.39) 4.55 (0.46) 3.82 (0.79) 7.82 (1.61) 
Videoconference (n = 90) 8.44 (1.85) 4.45 (0.49) 3.63 (0.77) 7.79 (1.67) 
Telephone (n = 88) 8.61 (1.45) 4.54 (0.47) 3.77 (0.84) 7.67 (1.75) 
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